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Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring 
Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities 
Abstract
 
With the development of modern information technologies, relying on nanotechnologies and 
remote sensing, a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the 
negative externalities generated by producers, consumers or travelers – road pricing schemes 
or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples. In the paper, we analyze a 
dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on 
emissions generated by heterogeneous agents. The paper’s contribution is to explicitly study a 
decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time. Each agent has to 
choose between paying a fixed fee or installing monitoring technology and paying a tax on 
actual emissions. We determine the second-best tax rates, the pattern of monitoring 
technology adoption, and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring 
technologies over time. 
 
Résumé : Les nouvelles technologies de mesure et le contrôle des externalités de stock 
 
Depuis longtemps, la régulation des externalités se heurte à des problèmes d’information. 
Avec le progrès technique il existe maintenant de nouvelles technologies qui se révèlent 
prometteuses pour la régulation des externalités : codes-barres digitaux (pouvant servir à 
tracer les lieux et méthodes de production), nanotechnologies permettant de tracer les 
molécules de produits chimiques dispersés dans l’eau ou de suivre des molécules transportés 
dans l’air, ou encore détecteurs de longue portée permettant de détecter les mouvements de 
voiture et de les faire payer selon leurs usages des routes en fonction de l’horaire et du flux de 
la circulation. Ce genre de technologies nécessite souvent un grand investissement dans 
l’infrastructure ainsi que des coûts variables afin de gérer chaque agent lié au système, comme 
c’est le cas pour les systèmes d’information géographique, par exemple. Le régulateur se 
trouve donc face au problème suivant : sous quelles conditions doit-il investir dans ces 
nouvelles technologies permettant une meilleure traçabilité des externalités, et, étant donné le 
progrès technique qui diminue les coûts d’investissements avec le temps, quand investir ? 
Comment la régulation doit-elle s’adapter pour prendre en compte ces nouvelles possibilités 
techniques ? Nous tentons de répondre à ces questions, en analysant un modèle d’optimisation 
dynamique d’un planificateur social face à un problème d’externalité de stock où le coût 
social augmente avec l’accumulation d’émissions. Nous utilisons des méthodes 
d’optimisation en deux étapes afin de résoudre le problème du planificateur : d’abord 
déterminer les émissions optimales selon les caractéristiques des agents, et ensuite déterminer 
la trajectoire optimale d’émissions dans le temps. Etant donné que le régulateur manque 
d’information sur les émissions des agents individuels nous proposons ensuite une politique 
volontaire de location de ce genre d’équipement une fois que l’investissement dans 
l’infrastructure aurait été effectué. 
 
Keywords:  externalities, environmental taxation, monitoring technology adoption, 
diffusion, nanotechnologies 
JEL codes:  D62, H23, L51, O33, Q58 
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1. Introduction 
Some of the major environmental problems of our time are stock externality problems, 
including contamination of bodies of water by accumulating salt and chemicals, climate 
change, other air pollution problems where accumulating pollutants damage health or 
property, deforestation and loss of biodiversity, etc. Frequently, the activities contributing to 
these problems cannot easily be attributed to individual agents, which is a challenge to policy 
making. However, applications of new technologies including computers and the internet, 
wireless telephony, remote sensing, and geographic information systems, enable the 
introduction of increased numbers of monitoring systems to identify externality sources. In 
some cases, e.g., road pricing in Singapore, we already see instantaneous monitoring of road 
use that generate negative externalities (congestion and air pollution). The new technologies 
may require large investment in infrastructure, as well as in individual units of equipment. 
While in some cases, individual agents may need to invest in new technologies, in other 
situations, polluters may subscribe to third- party monitoring services. If, through learning by 
doing and accumulated knowledge, costs of the technologies are likely to decrease over time, 
then adoption becomes more likely. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the adoption of new monitoring technologies 
over time, as part of a policy to control stock externalities. What is the socially optimal time 
path of investment in monitoring technology? What policy should the regulator adopt to 
encourage investment in monitoring technologies? The paper’s contribution is to explicitly 
study a decentralized policy for adoption of such new technology for monitoring over time. 
We thus focus on individual agents’ incentives to adopt monitoring technology, and on the 
trade-off between a decentralized policy and a policy consisting of compulsory monitoring. 
The optimal policy suggested in the paper in cases when monitoring or auditing are feasible 
but costly is that each agent is assumed “Guilty until Proven Innocent” as proposed by 
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Swierzbinski (2002), i.e., agents are required to pay the maximum pollution fee, and it is up to 
them to prove that they are entitled to a refund. Several existing or proposed regulations of 
pollution or damages stipulate that the polluter is responsible to provide evidence or 
measurement of pollution, and without it the government uses a conservative default value. 
For example, The California Department of Pesticide Regulation establishes default inhalation 
rates for children and adults for assessing the exposure rates to chemicals and those are 
imposed in cases when the applicator cannot provide her own assessments. The new proposed 
concept outline for the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard Regulation suggests that the 
carbon content of fuels will be verified at the user’s expense for every fuel category, 
otherwise a “conservative” default value is assumed.
1
 
The scheme that we propose for delegation of the investment in monitoring has potentially 
important applications since it results in diffusion of monitoring technology over time through 
voluntary adoption of the new technology. Resources are thus saved since monitoring costs 
may decline over time as the technology develops if there are economies to scale in 
production. One potentially relevant application is the use of smart dust in monitoring and 
tracing pollution to its source (Warneke et al., 2001; Sailor and Link, 2005). Identity 
preservation is already part of current food safety policies that rely on the tracing of a faulty 
product towards its origin (source). The trend today is towards nano-level identity 
preservation and tracing, and identity preservation through the tagging of molecules of dirty 
input can now be envisaged using nanotechnologies. Identity preservation applied to polluting 
inputs such as pesticides and chemical fertilizers would enable the regulator to trace the 
source of pollution in case of environmental degradation. The possibility to use identity 
preservation as a means to mark polluting inputs thus has interesting applications for water 
                                                 
1 Proposed Concept Outline for the California Low carbon Fuel Standard Regulation, accessed at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/032008lcfs_reg_outline.pdf. 
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quality policy, and will significantly improve on the information that is available to the 
regulator. 
The paper relates to several bodies of literature: the literature on threshold models of 
technology adoption, the literature on stock externalities and the literature on pollution 
regulation with costly information. The threshold model of technology adoption was first 
introduced by David (1969); it assumes that agents are heterogeneous (for example in size) 
and that profit maximization implies a threshold in the heterogeneity parameter, after which it 
becomes profitable for the individual agent to adopt. Technology diffusion over time will then 
depend on the distribution and dynamics of the characteristic that determines heterogeneity 
among adopters (Stoneman, 1983; Sunding and Zilberman, 2001). Here we use a threshold 
model to study the diffusion of new monitoring technology for stock externalities. Major 
environmental problems including water pollution, soil erosion, buildup of pesticides 
resistance, and climate change are frequently stock externality problems (Farzin, 1996), and 
moreover they are usually caused by heterogeneous sources (Hoel and Karp, 2002; 
Xepapadeas 1992). Thus, for an efficient design of policies to control stock externalities both 
time and heterogeneity dimensions of these problems should be considered (Xabadia, Goetz 
and Zilberman, 2006). The buildup of the pollution stock can be modified through changes in 
production practices, by reducing input use, by decreasing the number of agents that operate 
in the economy, and through adoption of modern technologies (Khanna and Zilberman, 
1997). The last body of research that we contribute to is the literature on pollution regulation 
with costly information. Many of today’s most important pollution problems are plagued by 
costly information on individual emissions. Examples include traffic emissions and 
agricultural runoff into water, such as nitrogen or pesticide leaching from fields. Carbon 
emissions from stoves and burners are another example. The diffuse pollution from many 
small sources whose individual emissions are unobservable constitutes a nonpoint source 
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pollution problem. Following Holmstrom (1982), it has been suggested to levy a tax equal to 
the full social marginal cost on each polluter (Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 1991; Herriges, 
Govindasamy and Shogren, 1994; Laffont, 1994; Hansen, 1998). In some cases, it can be 
difficult to do so, in particular when polluters do not realize their impact on the aggregate 
measure of pollution (Cabe and Herriges, 1992), or when the regulator cannot be certain about 
the level of cooperation within the group (Millock and Salanié, 2005). Investing resources in 
improving the monitoring of individual emissions may thus be worthwhile. Xepapadeas 
(1995) showed how risk-averse polluters may prefer to pay an emissions tax rather than a 
variable ambient tax. Millock, Sunding and Zilberman (2002) proposed discriminatory 
treatment  for agents who invest in monitoring equipment and pay a tax proportional to the 
pollution they generate, while others will pay a fixed tax. Thus, the definition of nonpoint 
source pollution is not fixed but will evolve as the social cost of pollution changes and as the 
cost of monitoring technologies is reduced over time.  
The first papers to study the dynamics of investment in monitoring have focused on the 
regulator’s centralized decision of investment in her stock of knowledge about the pollution 
process (Xepapadeas, 1995; Dinar and Xepapadeas, 1998, 2002; Farzin and Kaplan, 2004). 
Dinar and Xepapadeas (2002) develop a model of the regulator’s information acquisition for 
regulating groundwater in irrigated agriculture. Monitoring is treated as the regulator’s stock 
of knowledge (information), which can be added to by investments in geographical 
information systems (GIS), or study of the soil conditions in the region and other factors that 
affect transport and fate. There is thus no individual decision to adopt a monitoring 
technology at each individual source. The model shows theoretically and empirically (Dinar 
and Xepapadeas, 1998) that it is more efficient to direct resources to investment in knowledge 
capital about the emissions process than trying to monitor input use in order to levy input 
taxes as a proxy to pollution taxes. Farzin and Kaplan (2004) also model monitoring as an 
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effort on behalf of the regulator to improve a stock of knowledge capital, including 
knowledge of pollution transport and fate. They analyze the problem of a private or public 
manager that must target abatement resources in a National Park area with a fixed budget, and 
where the sediment load (pollution) is a function of unknown site-characteristics. Their 
simulations confirm that information acquisition improves the budget allocation of the 
National Park Manager and hence reduces expected damage compared with the case of an ex 
ante, uniform prior distribution of abatement effort. 
The basic model is presented in Section 2 below. Section 3 studies the baseline, regulation 
without observing individual pollution levels, while Section 4 studies the solution with 
mandatory monitoring. We analyze the optimal timing for introducing compulsory monitoring 
technology in Section 5. In Section 6 we analyze the proposed decentralized policy for 
monitoring diffusion over time, give conditions for monitoring diffusion and compare 
policies. The last Section concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
We model a large number of agents that are heterogeneous with regard to a special 
parameter !. The parameter ! should be interpreted as a characteristic that is unobservable to 
the regulator and affect efficiency. It could represent managerial ability, site-specific 
ecological conditions or properties of physical capital (bad insulation). In order to keep the 
model simple, we assume that ! is fixed and does not change over time. The regulator knows 
the overall distribution of !, which is defined on a support ,! !" #$ % , with a known continuous 
probability density function g(!) and distribution function G(!). The heterogeneity parameter 
! combined with input use determines output of each agent. Profits are represented by a 
reduced form notation where pollution (z) is viewed as an input to production, and profits net 
of input costs are denoted by ( , )z& ! . The profit function ( , )z& !  is assumed twice 
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differentiable, increasing and concave in pollution and the efficiency parameter.
2
 There are 2 
different cases for
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2
. Either the efficiency parameter increases the marginal profitability 
of the polluting input and 0
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(
''
'
!
&
z
, or increased efficiency implies reduced marginal 
profitability of the polluting input and 0
2
)
''
'
!
&
z
. Both cases can occur, but in different 
contexts. For example, if ! is a quality parameter and very productive agents also are very 
polluting, we would be in the first case; pollution from fertilizer use in agriculture would be 
an illustration. On the other hand, when the efficiency parameter measures efficiency in input 
use and pollution is created from unused residues from production, the second case applies.  
In the analysis, we will assume that the second condition holds and that more productive 
agents also have less pollution, as is the case with modern irrigation technologies that imply 
less water run-off and hence pollution from the field.  
Pollution is a function of the heterogeneity parameter !: z=z(!). The technology adoption 
indicator at time t is ),( t
i
!* , where i=0 indicates no monitoring, and i=1 indexes monitoring. 
The technology share ),( t
i
!* is between 0 and 1. For example, 1),(1 +t!*  if everyone of 
quality ! has invested in monitoring technology at time t. The following condition has to hold 
at each time t: 
 
          (1) 
0,1
( , ) 1 .
i
i
t! "
!
" #$ t
                                                
We thus take into account effects on the extensive margin, that is, the possibility that some 
agents will not produce. 
 
2
 We assume agents share a common production function (as well as pollution function) and that output differs 
only because of differences in ! and use of inputs. Later on, we will introduce an index i to indicate the 
difference in pollution when a firm is monitored or not. 
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 We can now define pollution at time t as a function of ! and whether an agent is monitored 
or not: zi=zi(!,t). Using the share of monitoring technology adoption, aggregate profits and 
pollution at time t are defined as: 
0,1
( ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ) ( )
i i
i
t t z t g
!
!
d* ! & ! ! ! !
+
, -
. + /
0 1
23 4       (2) 
 
0,1
( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
i i
i
Z t t z t g
!
!
d* ! ! !
+
, -
+ / 4
0 1
23 !        (3) 
 
Each agent pays a fixed annual unitary cost for monitoring, denoted vi, with v0=0 and v1= v. 
It is assumed equal for all monitored agents, since it represents a cost connected with the 
technology of tagging the pollution and not the individual agent. One example is transponder 
technology in road traffic control. The annualized cost can also be interpreted as a fee for a 
certification agency. The aggregate monitoring technology cost borne by the agents is: 
0,1
( ) ( , ) ( )
i i
i
V t t v g d
!
!
* ! !
+
, -
+ / 4
0 1
23 !         (4) 
There is also a fixed cost to the regulator to develop the infrastructure that supports the 
monitoring system, denoted by M(t). This cost is incurred at the moment of installing 
infrastructure. It is assumed that this cost decreases over time at a rate k, that is, 
( )
( )
M t
k
M t
!%
!
 
The pollutant accumulates over time with emissions Z(t), less the natural rate of decay, ", 
here assumed to be a simple linear function of the stock, S(t): 
0,1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
i i
i
S t Z t S t t z t g d S t
!
!
5 * ! ! ! !
+
, -
+ 6 + 6/ 4
0 1
23! 5     (5) 
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Finally, the social cost of the stock of pollution at time t is an increasing convex function 
C(S(t)). 
 
3. Optimal Regulation without Observing Pollution – The Case of a Franchise Fee 
Assume first that monitoring technologies are not available or that their cost is prohibitive. 
In this case, it is not possible to observe the agent’s emissions and only fixed fees are 
possible.
3
 When an agent of quality  faces a fixed fee, he solves the following problem:  "
0
0( ( , ), ) ( )
z
z t F tMax & ! ! 6  s.t. .  0 0z &
For every! , either 
' (0*
0
( , ),
( , )  solves  0 
z t
z t
z
# " "
"
)
!
)
or *0 ( , )z t! =0. This equation reflects 
the behavior of agents that cannot be observed individually. In this case, agents will produce 
at the private profit maximizing level as long as profits are positive.  
The solution of the private problem leads to computing critical quality levels 0 ( )F!  such 
that agents with 0 ( )F! !7 will be operating while all the agents with 0 (F )! !) are not 
operating. The pollution level of an agent varies with the heterogeneity parameter, and we can 
derive the following result on the impact of ! on pollution: 
0
2
2
2
*
)
'
'
''
'
6
+
z
z
d
dz
&
!
&
!
 iff 
2
0.
z
&
!
'
)
' '
 
The condition for a negative relation between pollution and the efficiency parameter holds 
when pollution originates from residues of production, and when the heterogeneity parameter 
is an indicator of input use efficiency. For example, in the case where irrigation is applied on 
                                                 
3 We study the extreme case when only a fixed fee is possible. Extensions of the model may include alternative 
regulatory measures depending on the information available to the regulator in the initial situation: input taxes (if 
input use is observable at no cost) or best management practices (if technology or practices are observable at no 
cost). In all cases, the policy instrument will be a second-best one, imperfectly correlated with the variable of 
interest, in this case pollution. 
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lands with different water holding capacities, heavy soils will utilize a higher percentage of 
applied water yielding more output and less runoff from the field and less pollution.  
Let 
0
*
0 0
( )
( ) ( ( , ), ) g( )
F
J F z t d
"
"
# " " "! * " . 
 
Then, the regulator’s problem is to find the level of the fixed annual fee over time to 
maximize social welfare. Thus, the optimization problem is given by:  
+ ,
( ) 0
0 0
( ( )) ( ( ))
. .     ( ) ( ( )) ( ),   (0)
rt
o
F t
J F t C S t e dt
s t S t Z F t S t S s
Max
$
-
%%
! %
*
! !
 
where 
0
*
0 0
( )
( ) ( , ) g( )
F
Z F z t
"
"
" "! * d" , that is, the aggregate level of emissions, s0 is the initial 
stock of pollution at time 0 and r is the social discount rate. We define the current value 
Hamiltonian by  
8 90 0 0 0( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )H J F t C S t Z F t S t: 5; 6 6 6 , 
where  denotes the costate variable. It has been multiplied by minus one to facilitate the 
interpretations. The first-order conditions for an interior solution are given by 
0%
0 0 0
0
( ( )) ( ( ))
=0
H J F t Z F t
F F F
:
' ' ',; 6 /' ' '0 1
-
4        (6) 
0
0
( ( ))H C S t
r
S S
0 0: 5 :
' '
; 6 + 6
' '
! :         (7) 
0 ( ( ))S Z F t S$! %! ,         (8) 0)0( sS +
Equation (6) states that the loss in private benefits (due to activity close-down) from a 
marginal increase in the fixed fee should equal the marginal decrease in aggregate emissions 
evaluated at the shadow price . Equation (7) explains the variation in the shadow cost of a 
delayed reduction of a marginal unit of the pollution stock from period t to period t+1. It 
0%
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establishes that the change is equal to the extra discounting and “decay” foregone paid on the 
shadow cost, 0( )r5 :< , minus the social cost of the extra pollution associated with the delay, 
. /C s' '
For a sustainable environmental policy, the social planner is particularly interested in the 
achievement of a steady state, defined by equations (7) and (8) with 0 0S: + +! ! . The following 
proposition describes the local stability properties of the steady state under the assumption of 
an interior solution for the control variable. 
Proposition 1: The steady state equilibrium point of the system of equations (7) and (8) is 
characterized by a local saddle point, where the stable path leading to the steady state is 
upward sloping. Therefore, the pollution stock, S, and its shadow cost, 0: , evolve over time i
the same direction. Aggregate pollution, Z0, varies negatively with respect to the shadow cos
Moreover, 
n 
t. 
0
0 , tha
F
%
)
.
)
 is, the optimal fixed fee and the shadow cost also evolve in the same 
direction. 
t
Proof: In appendix.  
 
If the initial pollution stock is smaller (greater) than the steady-state stock of pollution, the 
optimal policy consists of choosing the fixed fee F(t) initially below (above) its steady-state 
value and progressively increasing (decreasing) F(t) until the steady-state is reached.  
 
4. The Mandatory Monitoring Solution 
In this section we present the benchmark when monitoring technologies are available from 
time 0 (M=0). In this case, the most common policy has been the imposition of monitoring on 
all sources of pollution. Then, the social planner has full information on each polluter’s type, 
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and the nonpoint problem converts to a point source pollution problem where Pigouvian taxes 
can be implemented. Thus, the problem of the agents is now given by: 
1
1 1( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , )
z
z t t z tMax v& ! ! = !6 6  subject to . 1 0z &
Therefore, each agent chooses a level of pollution  that fulfills*1 ( , )z t"
*
1( ( , ), )z t
z
& ! !
=
'
+
'
, 
or when *1 ( , ) 0z t" ! 1 1( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , )z t t z t v 0& ! ! = !6
1( )
6 ) . Thus, as in the former case, we can 
compute a critical theta ! =
1( , )z t
 that will determine which agents that will operate in the 
economy. Like in the case of a pollution fee, the net social rents and the pollution level of an 
agent vary with the heterogeneity parameter. Net social rents, defined as 
1( ( , ), )z t v& ! ! = !6 6 , are non-decreasing in the efficiency parameter: 
*
0i i i
z& &
=
! ! !
' ' '
+ 6 (
' ' '
.  
Since production profits increase and pollution decreases with the efficiency parameter, 
social net rents are strictly increasing in the efficiency parameter. It can easily be shown, for 
an operating unit, that , since Pigouvian taxes affect the intensive margin, in 
addition to the extensive margin. 
* *
1 0( , ) ( , )z t z t" ""
Denote 8 9
1
*
1 1
( )
( ) ( ( , ), )  g( )J z t
!
! =
d= & ! ! > !+ 63 !
t
. 
The problem of the social planner is to find the evolution of the unit pollution tax over time 
that should be imposed on agents to maximize the discounted value of the net benefits of 
production less costs of monitoring and the social economic losses due to the accumulation of 
the pollutant: 
? @1
( ) 0
( ( )) ( ( )) rt
t
J t C S t e dMax
=
=
A
663  
s.t.  , 1( ) ( ( )) ( )S t Z t S t= 5+ 6! 0)0( sS + , 
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where 
1
*
1 1
( )
( ( )) ( , ) ( )Z t z t g
!
! =
d= ! !+ 3 !
5
.  
The current value Hamiltonian is defined as: 
8 91 1 1 1( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )H J t C S t Z t S t= : =+ 6 6 6  
where 1:  denotes the costate variable.
4
 The first-order conditions for an interior solution are: 
1 1 1
1 0
H J Z
:
= = =
' ' '
; 6 +
' ' '
         (9) 
1
1
( ( ))H C S t
r
S S
1 1:5 :
' '
; 6 + 6
' '
! :         (10) 
1( )S Z S= 5+ 6! ,          (11) 0)0( sS +
 
Equation (9) states that the marginal loss in private net benefits of increasing the Pigouvian 
tax should equal the temporal shadow value of the decrease in emissions. Equation (10) 
explains the variation in the shadow cost of a delayed reduction of a marginal unit of the 
pollution stock from period t to period t+1. It establishes that the change is equal to the extra 
discounting and “decay” forgone paid on the shadow cost, ( )r5 B< , minus the social cost of 
the extra pollution associated with the delay, /C s' ' . 
The steady state equilibrium of the system of equations (10) and (11) is qualitatively 
identical to the steady state defined in Proposition 1. Therefore, the pollution stock, S, and its 
shadow cost, 1: , evolve over time in the same direction, and the optimal tax and the shadow 
cost also evolve in the same direction. 
                                                 
4 Similarly to the previous case, the co-state variable has also been multiplied by minus one to facilitate the 
interpretations. 
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5. Optimal Timing of Introducing Compulsory Monitoring Technology 
In the last section we only took into account the variable cost of monitoring (v) and 
assumed that monitoring was available at zero initial investment cost. However, this is far 
from reality. Usually, monitoring requires a large investment cost in infrastructure, e.g., 
satellites for GIS, and therefore, it may not be optimal to install monitoring technologies from 
the beginning of the time horizon. Thus, it is important to determine when monitoring should 
be installed. We start by assuming that once the investment cost is incurred by the 
government, monitoring will become mandatory for all agents in the economy. 
The problem of the social planner, in addition to determine the level of the taxes to impose 
on the agents, is to decide at what time T to carry out the investment in monitoring 
infrastructure. Her decision problem is given by:  
? @ ?0 1
( ), ( ), 0
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
T
rt rT rt
F t t T T
J F t C S t e dt M t e J t C S t e dtMax
=
=
A
6 66 6 < 63 3 @ 6
C
A
T
 
s.t. 
0
1
0
( ) ( ( )) ( ),        0
( ) ( ( )) ( ),         <
S(0)=s
( ) ( )
S t Z F t S t t T
S t Z t S t T t
M t kM t
5
= 5
+ 6 C
+ 6 C
+ 6
!
!
!
 
 
We derive necessary conditions for the optimization problem following Makris (2001) and 
Boucekkine, Saglam and Vallée (2004). Conditions (6-8) remain valid for  and 
conditions (9-11) for . However, there is one additional matching condition with 
respect to the social cost of pollution: , as well as conditions with respect to the 
switching time T: 
0 t T" "
T t" /-
0 1( ) ( )T% %!
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0 1
0 1
0 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )       0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )       0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      then never introduce monitoring.
H T r k M T H T T
H T r k M T H T T
H T r k M T H T
0 0 ! / /-
0 0 " !
0 0 &
                (12)     
 
Following Boucekkine, Saglam and Vallée (2004), since the objective function of the 
problem is strictly concave in the control variables and since it is discounted, the 
transversality condition is given by . 1 1lim ( ) ( ) 0,    with lim ( ) 0
t t
S t t t% %
1- 1-
! &
Moreover, in order for  to be a maximum, the condition  *T
* *
0( ) ( )( ) ( 1 0
H T H T
k r k M
T T
' '
6 < 6 )
' '
0) kte6   has to be satisfied. The second-order condition 
holds here since the two Hamiltonians in our problem are time autonomous. 
A postponement of the investment in monitoring technology saves the interest rate and the 
reduction in the cost of the technology. Substituting for M(T) into equation (12) leads to: 
*
*
*
* * *
0 1
* * *
0 1
* *
0 1
( ) ( ) (0) ( )       0
( ) ( ) (0) ( )       0
( ) ( ) (0) ( )      then never introduce monitoring
kT
kT
kT
H T r k M e H T T
H T r k M e H T T
H T r k M e H T
%
%
%
0 0 ! / /-
0 0 " !
0 0 &
           (13) 
Therefore, 
*
0
(0)
T
M
)
.
)
. If the initial investment is high, investment is delayed. On the 
other hand, the impact of a change in the rate of reduction of the investment cost (k) is 
ambiguous. We have 
+ ,** 1 ( )
0  
( )
T r kT
k k r k
% 0 .)
!
/) 0
. There are two countervailing effects. An 
increase in k directly increases the rewards of waiting since it is cheaper to adopt later on. But 
at the same time it decreases the absolute investment cost (0) kTM e% , so that equation (13) 
may be fulfilled earlier. The rewards of waiting dominate if *T /
1
( )r k0
. 
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6. A Decentralized Policy for Monitoring Diffusion over Time. 
Monitoring is costly ( ) and therefore it may not be optimal to monitor all sources of 
pollution at the time the fixed cost of investment in monitoring infrastructure becomes 
comparable to the economic efficiency gains from monitoring. This section presents a 
decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time. The aim is to study the 
diffusion of monitoring technologies once the investment in the infrastructure has taken place. 
When agents are monitored, the regulator can levy a charge on each unit of pollution; but for 
unmonitored agents only fixed fees are possible that do not depend on the agent’s pollution, 
nor type. We propose to analyse a simple scheme consisting of a fixed fee F0  on agents that 
are not monitored and an emission tax # for monitored agents combined with a fixed payment 
F1 (that could be negative). Hence, polluters are assumed guilty until proven innocent (as in 
Swierzbinski, 2002), i.e., they pay a fixed fee unless they install monitoring equipment to 
prove their actual pollution. 
0v.
The model relies upon two important assumptions – reversible investment in monitoring 
and that the regulator cannot exploit information in previous time periods to regulate 
individual agents in the current time period. These are important assumptions and we will 
thus spend some time on their justification and rationality for the question at hand. Apart from 
simplifying the solution of the model, it is important to allow for reversibility if the regulator 
wishes to maximize social welfare. Imagine a case where the marginal social damage cost 
decreases over time; then an optimal solution may involve increasing pollution and hence 
decreasing monitoring over time. It is thus necessary to allow for reversibility in the 
monitoring investment decision. The way we choose to model the monitoring investment 
decision is that the agents can choose whether to rent monitoring equipment or not in each 
time period. This implicitly means assuming that the regulator does not retain information on 
agents’ quality. Although representing an extreme case, the assumption is not unreasonable. 
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Keeping track on the activity of every agent is costly, especially if the data is to be used for 
tax assessment in justifying and protecting against costly lawsuits. While our model is 
deterministic, a more realistic model would include randomness that could affect individual 
agents and their actions. The overall distribution of !  may be constant over time, but the !  of 
individual agents may vary. Income taxes, for example, require new reporting every year and 
rely little on past actions to justify present decisions. We can assume that the regulator has the 
analytical capacity and good sampling techniques that allow her to calculate sophisticated tax 
formulas, but that both monitoring and memory of individual behavior are costly. 
6.1. The general problem 
We follow Millock, Sunding and Zilberman (2002) and suggest the following simple linear 
taxation scheme to delegate adoption of monitoring: Agents that adopt monitoring equipment 
will pay an emission tax # per unit of pollution, and a fixed amount, F1, per operating agent, 
which is a tax when F1 is positive and a subsidy when F1 is negative. The non-adopters whose 
pollution is unobservable will pay the same fixed fee, F0. In each period, the individual agent 
takes the regulatory instruments F0(t), F1(t) and #(t) as given and solves the following 
problem: 
 
? @0 0 1 1 1( ( , ), ) ( ), ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) .Max z t F t z t t z t F t v& ! ! & ! ! = !6 6 6 6  
 
For a given ! , the agent chooses to rent monitoring equipment ( 1),(1 +t!* ) iff 
1 0 1 1 0( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 0.z t z t t z t F t F t v& ! ! & ! ! = !6 6 6 < 6 7  
 
Define the critical level !c by the level of the heterogeneity parameter for which an agent is 
just indifferent between renting monitoring equipment or not: 
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1 0 1 1 0( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 0c c c c cz t z t t z t F t F t v t& ! ! & ! ! = !6 6 6 < 6 + D    (14) 
 
The following comparative statics describe the impact of the regulatory policy instruments 
on the critical level for adoption of monitoring: 
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since we assume that 0
2
)
''
'
!
&
z
. 
The regulator’s problem is: 
0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
( , , ; )
0 1
( ), ( ), ( ) 0 ( ) ( , , ; )
( ( , ), ) ( ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( ( ))
c
c
F F v
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F t F t t T F F v
e z t dG z t dG V C SMax
! = !
= ! ! =
& ! ! ! & ! ! !
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6
, -
< 6/ 4
/ 4
0 1
3 3 3 t dt6
s.t.
0 1
0 0 0 1
( , , ; )
0 1
( ) ( , , ; )
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
c
c
F F v
F F F v
S t z t dG z t dG S
! = !
! ! =
! ! ! ! 56 0(0)S s+ <3 3! , +
 
Following Xabadia, Goetz and Zilberman (2006), we will use a two-stage procedure to 
solve the problem. First, the regulator will choose the optimal allocation of emissions over 
quality, ! , given an aggregate level of pollution Z. Next, he will optimize the value of Z over 
time. 
In the first stage, the regulator’s solution is given by the value function J(Z) defined as 
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Since Z does not depend on the heterogeneity parameter (!) the shadow cost of the pre-
specified level of emissions (") is constant over !. The optimal level of monitoring adoption 
can be attained by the policy described in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Given aggregate pollution Z, optimal adoption over quality can be obtained 
with the combination of the following instruments: 
A fixed fee on non-monitored agents: 0 0 ( )F z: !+  
A fixed fee on monitored agents: 8 91 0 0 0( ) ( )cF z z: ! !+ 6  
A unit emission tax on monitored agents:  # =: . 
 
Proof: In appendix. 
 
This policy scheme can be interpreted as a fixed fee on all agents 0 0 ( )F z 0: !+ , and a 
subsidy 1 0 ( )cF z: !+ 6 on agents that decide to adopt monitoring. The monitored agents also 
pay a unit emission tax which is equal to the shadow cost of emissions. In this way, monitored 
agents are taxed according to the pollution they generate, but subsidized for part of the 
overestimate of pollution before the installation of the monitoring system. 
In the second stage, the value function J(Z) from the first stage is maximized over time: 
? @3
A
66
0)(
))(())(( dtetSCtZJ rt
tZ
Max  
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s.t.  , )()()( tStZtS 56+! 0)0( sS + , . 0)( 7tZ
The parameter denoting aggregate emissions over the entire range of ! now becomes the 
decision variable in the second stage. The current value Hamiltonian of the second stage is 
defined as: 
8 9)()())(())(( tStZtSCtZJH 5B 666+  
where B  denotes the costate variable. It has been multiplied by minus one to facilitate the 
interpretations. The first-order conditions for an interior solution are: 
 
0
H J
Z Z
B
' '
; 6 +
' '
          (18) 
( ( ))H C S t
r
S S
B5
' '
; 6 + 6
' '
!B B         (19) 
SZS 56+! ,          (20) 0)0( sS +
 
Equation (18) states that the marginal value of aggregate emissions should equal the 
temporal shadow cost of the pollution stock B . By the Envelope Theorem, a change in the 
value function as a result of a change in aggregate pollution Z is equal to $. From (18), we 
then see that the shadow values of aggregate pollution in the first and second stages of the 
optimization are identical, i.e., : B+ . Equation (19) explains the variation in the shadow cost 
of a delayed reduction of a marginal unit of the pollution stock from period t to period t+1. It 
establishes that the change is equal to the extra discounting and “decay” forgone paid on the 
shadow cost, ( )r5 B< , minus the social cost of the extra pollution associated with the delay 
. /C s' '
The steady state equilibrium of the system of equations (19) and (20) is qualitatively 
identical to the steady state defined in Proposition 1, so it is characterized by a saddle point. 
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Therefore, like in the cases of compulsory monitoring or no monitoring at all, the pollution 
stock, S, and its shadow cost, B , evolve over time in the same direction.  
The incentives for adoption of monitoring equipment over time can be summarized in the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Given that the initial pollution stock, , is greater (smaller) than the 
steady-state stock of pollution, , the optimal decentralized policy for monitoring diffusion 
over time consists of: 
0S
S
A
a) choosing the unit emissions tax, = , above (below) its steady-state value and 
gradually decreasing (increasing) the tax over time.  
b) choosing the fixed fee, 0F ,  above (below) its steady-state value and gradually 
decreasing (increasing) it over time.  
c) choosing the subsidy 1F , below (above) its steady-state value and gradually 
increasing (decreasing) it over time 11 0,  i.e., 0 
F
F
Z
', -( )/ 4'0 1
!  iff 
0
0
01 1
1
( )( )
c
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z
z
zz z
=
!
&&
! !
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Corollary: When , there will be diffusion of monitoring equipment over time, that 
is, , if 
0S S
A(
0
c
! )! 0 01
( ( , ), )( ( , ), )
c c c
z zz t( )
c
t! & ! !& ! !
=
! ! !
, -' ''
( 6/ 4' ' '0 1
. When , the contrary 
holds. 
0S S
A)
Proof: In appendix.  
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The Corollary determines the adoption of monitoring over time (
c
!! ). Since the decision on 
monitoring depends on both the evolution of the emission tax and the fixed fees, we define 
two scenarios: 
A) The new externality case, where 0S S
A) : 0= (!  
B) The restoration case, where 0S S
A( : 0= )!  
In Case A, that we label the new externality case, there is early awareness of pollution and 
as pollution grows towards its steady-state level, the shadow cost of pollution increases over 
time causing aggregate emissions in each time period to decrease to allow the stock of 
pollution to reach its steady-state value. Aggregate emissions can be modified either by 
changing the proportion of monitored agents, as indicated by 
c
! , or by changing the external 
margin, that is, by changing the number of agents that operate. As shown in the appendix, 
0 0
F
Z
'
)
'
, and therefore the optimal fixed fee increases over time causing the number of 
polluting agents to decrease until the steady state is reached. Moreover, since the shadow cost 
of pollution grows over time, the unit emissions tax also increases over time. In this way, the 
intensive and extensive margins can be considered as complementary.  The direct effect of the 
increasing emission tax discourages monitoring adoption. On the other hand, the subsidy 
given to monitored agents, , may increase or decrease over time and therefore, the diffusion 
of monitoring depends on  the sign of 
1F
0 01
( ) ( ( , ), )( ( , ), )
c
c c c
z z tz t! & ! !& ! !
=
! ! !
, -' ''
6 6/ 4' ' '0 1
. If the 
marginal gain in profitability from the reduction in pollution brought about by monitoring 
adoption exceeds the marginal change in the pollution tax payment, then there will be full 
diffusion of monitoring over time.  
The more interesting case may be Case B - the restoration case. For the restoration case, 
when monitoring has not been implemented or was not feasible to start with because of the 
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costs of compulsory monitoring, the regulator may implement the second-best policy defined 
in Proposition 3. As pollution is reduced towards its optimal steady-state level, the shadow 
cost of pollution decreases over time, hence initial policy needs to be harsh to reduce 
sufficiently the aggregate emissions, and it softens till the steady-state is reached. In this case, 
0= )! , causing a direct positive effect on the diffusion of monitoring equipment, that is, the 
reduction of the pollution tax encourages more agents to adopt monitoring equipment over 
time. The initial fixed fee  needs also to be high to deter the more polluting agents and it 
decreases over time as the pollution problem diminishes. The final impact on adoption will 
depend, as before, on the evolution of the subsidy. We know that the evolution of the 
emission tax encourages monitoring adoption in this case, but that the evolution over time of 
the fixed fee has a discouraging effect on adoption. In the end, the condition for diffusion, 
stated in the Corollary of Proposition 3, implies that the marginal gain in the variable tax 
payment has to exceed the marginal change in profitability from the reduction in pollution 
caused by adoption of monitoring.  
0F
In order to compare the effects of mandatory and voluntary policies on the diffusion of 
monitoring over time we will focus on the case when the marginal unit of production is fixed.
6.2. Technology diffusion and policy comparison 
In the special case of no effects on the extensive margin the optimal linear policy consists 
of a fixed fee on all agents equal to the social cost of pollution from the last unit to adopt 
monitoring equipment, and a per unit emission tax on monitored agents: 
 
Proposition 4: With no effects on the extensive margin, optimal adoption of monitoring 
can be obtained with a fixed fee F0(t) on non-monitored units and a unit emission tax #(t) on 
monitored units: 
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)()( tt B= + , and  
),()()( 0 tzttF c!B+ . 
Proof: In appendix. 
 
In this case, how do the two policies of mandatory introduction of new monitoring 
technology versus voluntary adoption compare? First note that the voluntary policy leads to 
full adoption iff the lowest quality agent prefers to adopt monitoring technology given its 
costs and the values of the policy parameters in the steady-state:  
1 0 1( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) when z t z t t z t F t v t& ! ! & ! ! = !6 6 < ( EA . When full adoption 
occurs in the steady-state, the two policies differ only in the time path to obtain the steady-
state: 
 
Proposition 5: With no effects on the extensive margin, pollution build-up is faster under a 
policy of mandatory monitoring between 0 t T) ) in the new externality case. 
In the restoration case, the reduction of the existing pollution stock takes place at a smaller 
pace between  under a policy of mandatory monitoring. 0 t T) )
Proof: The Proposition follows directly from the fact that 0( ( ))Z F t > 1( ( ))Z t= , hence 
. 0 1( ) ( )S t S t(! !
 
FIGURE 1a ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1a illustrates the pollution time path under the two policies for the new 
externality case. The pollution stock builds up faster initially under the mandatory monitoring 
policy, since the regulator can use only a franchise fee between time 0 and T, the date of the 
investment in the technology and introduction of mandatory monitoring. The voluntary policy 
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yields a slower build-up of pollution over the entire time period, but will ultimately converge 
towards the same steady-state, if the conditions for full adoption of the new technology are 
satisfied. For the restoration case, the initial stock is reduced at a smaller pace with mandatory 
monitoring than under a policy of voluntary adoption of monitoring technology between time 
0 and T (as illustrated in Figure 1b).  
 
FIGURE 1b ABOUT HERE 
 
When full adoption of the new monitoring technology is not obtained, the steady-state 
pollution stock will be higher under the policy of voluntary adoption compared to the policy 
of mandatory monitoring, but since monitoring costs are saved and agents’ private surplus is 
larger, this is socially optimal. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The contribution of this paper is to develop a dynamic model for the management of a 
stock pollution problem through gradual diffusion of monitoring equipment when the 
regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agents. 
The model developed here could be applied to a wide variety of externalities, but the 
analysis focused on the problem of stock pollution. Most analyses of nonpoint source 
pollution problems assume that the regulator is able to fully observe some variables correlated 
with individual emissions, such as input use or technology choice. In practice, however, very 
often the regulator cannot observe individual input or output and there is no proxy variable 
available to the regulator to build a policy based on agents’ observable practices. For 
example, the regulator may observe quantity of output but not quality and increases in quality 
may require use of chemicals or other assets. In case of indoor production observation is 
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particularly difficult. Thus, it may be worthwhile to invest resources in improving the 
monitoring of individual emissions directly. We observe the emergence of third party 
observers that monitor externalities, taking advantage of new technologies (remote sensing, 
nanotechnologies). The use of such services is becoming part of the regulatory process. 
Alternatively, regulation may demand that new monitoring technologies are installed (as was 
the case with Continuous Emissions Monitoring for the US sulfur dioxide emissions market). 
In both cases, regulators require monitoring with accurate reporting of externalities. The 
burden of proof is on the polluter who should provide estimation of damages, or otherwise is 
taxed at a conservative default.  
The paper has analyzed two different types of regulation when it comes to the introduction 
of new information technologies enabling monitoring of the activities of individual agents. 
First, we studied the case of mandatory monitoring when all agents are forced to adopt a 
monitoring technology that enables the regulator to perfectly assess each polluter’s emissions. 
In that case first-best externality-correcting taxes can be imposed. We derived the optimal 
timing of mandatory regulation and compared the outcome with the optimal solution at the 
steady-state. However, mandatory monitoring is not necessarily the optimal policy, since new 
monitoring technologies require costly investment and the investment cost may decrease over 
time. Thus, we also considered the case of voluntary monitoring. The proposed regulatory 
scheme differentiates taxation according to the installation of individual monitoring 
equipment. Each agent has to choose between paying a fixed fee, or installing monitoring 
technology and paying a tax on the actual generation of externalities. The highest quality 
agents will have incentives to adopt a monitoring technology if the gain from direct taxation 
is large enough to outweigh the profit impact and the direct monitoring costs. Since the taxes 
will evolve over time as the social shadow price of the externality changes, adoption of 
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monitoring technology will also change accordingly. We analyzed the adoption pattern and 
identified conditions for the diffusion of monitoring technologies over time.  
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
A linearization of the canonical system of differential equations around the steady-state 
values of 0:  and S results in: 
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Since the trace of the Jacobian matrix is equal to r>0, employing the fact that it equals the 
sum of its eigenvalues assures that at least one eigenvalue is positive. Additionally, the 
determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative and thus, the eigenvalues have opposite signs 
and the steady state equilibrium is locally characterized by a saddle point. For any initial 
value of S within the neighborhood of SA , where the superscript A  indicates the steady state 
equilibrium value, it is possible to find a corresponding value of the shadow cost which 
assures that the optimal environmental policy leads towards the long-run optimum. 
The slopes of the  and the 0 0: +! 0S +! isoclines are: 
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A phase diagram of the system might look like the one depicted below. 
 
Figure: The phase diagram in the 0( , )S : space. 
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In addition, we have that
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where term A is zero by the definition of the extensive margin under the optimal policy, and 
term B is positive since 
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Proof of Proposition 2. 
 
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier by $, the Lagrangian for the problem is: 
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The solution to the problem has to satisfy the following necessary conditions: 
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Equations (15)-(17) in the article show that 
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the necessary condition (A2) to hold we need to have 
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further has that adoption is given by equation (14): 
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Comparing equation (14) with equation (A2) it can be observed that the regulator’s optimal 
adoption decision coincides with the private agents iff 
8 90 1 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0c c cF t F t t z t z t z t= ! : ! !6 6 6 6 +
8 91 0 0 0( ) ( , ) ( , )cF t z t z t: ! !+ 6
tD . We thus have that 
. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Prop. 3a) follows directly from the fact that = :+  and that $ and S evolve over time in the 
same direction, hence 0= )!  iff 0S S
A( . 
Prop. 3b) and 3c): Let us redefine the policy scheme as a fixed fee on all agents 
0 0 ( )F z 0: !+ , and a subsidy (negative fee) 1 0 ( )cF z: !+ 6 on agents that decide to adopt 
monitoring. In this case, applying the chain rule we obtain:  
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0
( )
( )
F z
z
0F! !=
Z Z F Z
! =
!
' ' ''
+ <
' ' ' ' '
'
 and 01 10
1
( )
( ) c c c
c
c
zF F
z
Z Z Z
! ! != =
! =
! =
, -' ' '' '' '
+ 6 6 </ 4
F Z' ' ' ' ' '0 1'
 
respectively. After some operations it gives:  
0 0
0
0 0 0
0 0
( )
0
( )
1
z
F Z
Z z
F
=
!
! !
=
!
'
' '+
' , -' '
6/ 4' '0 1
) ,       (A5) 
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1
c c
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c
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c
z
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F
Z Z z
F
! !
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! ==
! !
=
!
, -' '
</ 4' '' ' 0+ 6 )(
' ' , -' '
</ 4' '0 1
1 .     (A6) 
since  0
Z
='
6 (
'
,  1 0
F
Z
'
)
'
if the nominator and denominator have opposite signs. In the case 
where 00
( )
( ) 0c c
c
c
z
z
! !
! =
! =
' '
< (
' '
 and 0
1
( )
1 c c
c
z
F
0
! !
=
!
' '
< )
' '
, substituting the derivatives of  
c
!  
leads, after some transformations, to: 
0 0
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c c
c c
c
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!
=
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' , -'' O6/ 4 O' '0 1
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O( O' , -'' O6/ 4' ' O0 1 N
 
Since 0
1
( , )
1
( , )
c
c
z t
z t
!
!
( , 1 0
F
Z
'
)
'
 iff  
0
0
101
( )
( , )
1
( , )( )( )
c
c c
c
c c
z
z t
z tzz
!
=
! !
!&&
! !
'
'
) )
, -''
6/ 4' '0 1
.
5
  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary. 
 
Applying the chain rule, the change in 
c
!  is given by: 
 
1
1
c c c
F
Z F Z Z
! ! ! =
=
' ' '' '
+ <
' ' ' ' '
        (A7) 
 
since  has been redefined as a fixed fee on all agents, and thus 0F
0
0c
F
!'
+
'
.  
The substitution of equation (A6) into (A7) and simplifying the resulting equation leads to 
 
0
1
0
1
( )
( )
1
c c
c
c
c c
c
z
Z F
Z z
F
! !=
!
=!
! !
=
!
, -' ''
6 6/ 4' ' '' 0+
' , -' '
</ 4' '0 1
1        (A8) 
 
Substituting in equations (16) and (17) from the text for 
1
c
F
!'
'
and c
!
=
'
'
 gives: 
                                                 
5 Note that the case where the numerator is negative and the denominator is positive is not feasible.  
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0 1
0 01 1
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(A9) 
 
Given that the numerator in (A9) is positive, for c
Z
!'
'
to be greater than zero, the 
denominator needs also to be positive. Substituting the value of 
1
c
F
!'
'
 into the expression 
0
1
( )
1 c c
c
z
F
! !
=
!
, -' '
</ ' '0 1
4 , we obtain that it will be positive iff  
0
01
( )
1 0
( , )( , )
c
c
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z
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!
=
!
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'
'
< (
, -''
6/ 4' '0 1
, i.e., iff 0 01
( ) ( ( , ), )( ( , ), )
c
c c c
z zz t t! & ! !& ! !
=
! ! !
, -' ''
) 6/ 4' ' '0 1
. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
 
With a fixed extensive margin, the regulator’s problem is: 
( , ; )
0 1
( ), ( ) 0 ( , ; )
( ( , ), ) ( ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( ( ))
c
c
F v
rt
F t t F v
e z t dG z t dG V C S t dMax
! = !
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& ! ! ! & ! ! !
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6
, -
< 6 6/ 4
/ 4
0 1
3 3 3 t
s.t. SdGtzdGtztS
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c
c
5!!!!
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!
!
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6<+ 3 3
);,(
);,(
10 )(),()(),()(
! .
The current-value Hamiltonian is 
8 9
4
4
1
-
/
/
0
,
6<6
6666<+
3 3
3 3
);,(
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)(),()(),(
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c
c
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!
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=!
!
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5!!!!B
!!!!!&!!!&
 
where # represents the shadow value of the pollution accumulation constraint. By ignoring the 
non-negativity constraints initially and simply writing the first-order conditions for the 
Hamiltonian we obtain: 
 
C
r
S
B5 B B
'
6 < + 6
'
!  for the costate variable. 
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Rewriting equation (14) to define the critical level of quality (
c
! ) for which the agent is 
indifferent between renting monitoring equipment or not gives: 
0 1 1( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0c c c c cz t z t t z t F t v t& ! ! & ! ! = !6 < 6 < + D  
 
1 0
1
0
( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), )
c
c c
F z t z t
!
& ! ! & ! !
! !
'
+ 6 )
' , -' '
6/ 4' '0 1
     (A10) 
1
01
( , )
0
( ( , ), )( ( , ), )
c c
c c
z t
z tz t
! !
= & ! !& ! !
! !
'
+
' , -''
6/ 4' '0 1
(      (A11) 
Since equations (A10) and (A11) show that 
F
c
'
'!
 and 
=
!
'
'
c  are non-zero, we have that the 
regulator’s optimal choice of monitoring adoption is characterized by 
8 90 1 0 1( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), ) ( , ) ( , ) 0c c c c c cz t z t v z t z t& ! ! & ! ! B ! !6 < 6 6 +
)()( tt
tD  and can deduce that if 
B= + ),()()( 0 tzttF cand !B+ , then the agents’ choices will coincide with the regulator’s. 
Q.E.D. 
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